Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2008

State of Utah v. Travis James Perkins : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Blake A. Nakamura, Sara Pfrommer; counsel for apellant.
David R. Brickey; Summit County Attorney; counsel for appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Perkins, No. 20080961 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1311

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

.TRAVIS JAMES PERKINS
Appellant
Case No. 20080961

vs.
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee.

OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT TRAVIS JAMES PERKINS

Blake A. Nakamura
142 East 200 South, Suite 312
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
and
Sara Pfrommer
2663 Little Kate Road
Park City, UT 84060
Counsel for Appellant
David R. Brickey
Summit County Attorney
6300 North Silver Creek Drive
Park City, UT 84098
Counsel for Appellee
FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

JAN 2 2 2009

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

TRAVIS JAMES PERKINS
Appellant
Case No. 20080961

vs.
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee.

OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT TRAVIS JAMES PERKINS

Blake A. Nakamura
142 East 200 South, Suite 312
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
and
Sara Pfrommer
2663 Little Kate Road
Park City, UT 84060
Counsel for Appellant
David R. Brickey
Summit County Attorney
6300 North Silver Creek Drive
Park City, UT 84098
Counsel for Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS

JURISDICTION

1

ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

6

ARGUMENT

8

The Trial Court Erred When It Denied Defendant's Motion
to Suppress Evidence Obtained By Invading Defendant's
Private Space and Compelling Him Open a Locked Door
to Answer Questions

8

A.

The Arresting Officer's Warrantless Incursion
Onto Defendant's Back Patio Was A Violation
of Defendant's Fourth Amendment Right Against
Unreasonable Search and Seizure

8

1.

The Area Is Immediately Adjacent to the Home

10

2.

The Area Is Included Within An "Enclosure" Defined
by the Natural Terrain Surrounding the Condo Unit

11

Use

13

3.

1

4.

B.

Steps Taken By the Defendant to Protect His Privacy

The Arresting Officer's Detention of Defendant After
The Illegal Incursion Was A Violation of Defendant's Fourth
Amendment Right Against Unreasonable Search and Seizure

CONCLUSION

ADDENDUM
1.

Memorandum Decision dated May 1, 2008

2.

Judgment and Commitment dated October20, 2008

13

14

17

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206; 87 S.Ct. 424 (1966)
Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55
State v. Alvey, 2007 UT App 161

8
15
15, 16

State v. Atwood, 831 P.2d 1056, 1058 (Ut.App. 1992)

8

State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95

1

State v. Tripp, 2008 UT App. 388

1

United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987)

9 - 14

United States v. Reilly, 76 F.3d. 1271 (2nd Cir. 1996)

11,12

Williams v. Garrett, 722 F. Supp. 254 (W.D. Va. 1989)

11.12

Statutes and Other Authorities
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e)

Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States

2, 7 et seq.

JURISDICTION

This case is an appeal from a Judgment and Commitment issued by the Third
District Court for Summit County, State of Utah. This court has jurisdiction over this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e).

ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Did the trial court err when it refused to suppress the evidence of defendant's
intoxication when the evidence supporting the charge of driving while intoxicated was
only obtained after the arresting officer:
a) entered the defendant's private patio to peer through a window that
could not be viewed from any public walkway or place; and
b) ordered the defendant to come to the patio's sliding glass door, where
the officer to observe his "glassy eyes" and "odor of alcohol."
In reaching its erroneous determination not to suppress the evidence obtained after
this illegal incursion and detention, the trial court failed to apply the correct law to the
facts of the case. The denial of a motion to suppress evidence is reviewed for
correctness, without deference to the trial court's decision. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95,
If 15; State v. Tripp, 2008 UT App. 388, \ 12.
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Preservation of Issues on Appeal. The trial court issued its Judgment and
Commitment on October 20, 2007. (Addendum;CTl98-200).

Perkins timely filed his

notice of appeal with the Third District Court, Summit County, on November 18, 2007.
(CT:200-3).

APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The constitutional provision applicable to the issues in this case is the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America, which reads in its
entirety:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case commenced with the arrest of the defendant, Travis Perkins, on
December 12, 2007. The arrest occurred after 4 a.m., based on evidence obtained by a
police officer who had identified the defendant through a sliding glass door that could
only be viewed from a private patio at the rear of the defendant's condominium.
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Following the arrest, an information was issued on December 13, 2008 charging the
defendant with driving under the influence, a third degree felony.
A preliminary hearing was held on February 12, 2008, after which the defendant
was bound over for trial. On March 10, 2008, defendant made a motion to suppress the
evidence obtained by the police through the illegal search and detention of the defendant.
(CT:26-37). An evidentiary hearing was held on March 31, 2008. (All "RT" references
herein are to the Reporter's Transcript of the evidentiary hearing).
Following the evidentiary hearing, the trial court permitted the parties to file
additional memoranda. The state filed its opposition to the motion to suppress on April
16, 2008. (CT:48-66).

The defendant filed a reply on April 28, 2008 (CT:71-79) and

oral argument was held on that same day, after which the trial court took the matter under
advisement.
On May 1, 2008, the trial court issued its Memorandum Decision denying the
motion to suppress. (Addendum; CT:81-9).After a trial by jury during which the State
relied upon the illegally obtained evidence, the defendant was found guilty of the third
degree felony of driving under the influence. On October 20, 2008, the trial court issued
its Judgment and Commitment, sentencing the defendant to be confined at the Utah State
Prison for a period of zero to five years and fining him $3,000, plus an 85% surcharge.
(Addendum). This appeal followed.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The events giving rise to this appeal occurred in the early hours between 3:30 and
4:30 a.m. on December 12, 2007. (RT:30:14-20).

In those early morning hours, a Deer

Valley security guard (Muller) called the Park City Police Department to report that he
had seen a driver who was apparently stuck, attempting to maneuver his vehicle1 out of
the snow by the side of the road. (RT: 11:7-15) Muller spoke with the driver who, in
Muller's opinion may have been intoxicated, but gave no particular or specific
information to support that conclusion. (RT: 11:4-6). Muller called 911 and asked for
the assistance of the police. (RT:11-12).
After Muller called the police, the driver of the car left his vehicle and headed
toward a nearby parking structure and condominium complex. (RT: 14). The police
officer (Lealaitafea) arrived and spoke with Muller, who described the driver and pointed
in the direction he had been walking. (RT: 16). The trial court ruled that the information
that Muller gave to the police officer "did not amount to reasonable suspicion to detain
defendant." Memorandum Decision, ^f 3, p. 5. (CT:85).
Heading off in the direction indicated by Muller, Lealaitafea noticed some
footprints in the snow. (RT:33:10-12). He did not know who had made the footprints, but

1

Muller testified at the evidentiary hearing that the individual he saw, and about whom he
made the 911 call, was driving a Ford. (RT:7:5-6). When questioned by the police, however, the
defendant said that he was driving a Subaru station wagon. (RT:38:20-21).
4

he followed them anyway. (RT:49-16-20).

The path of the footprints took him away

from the shoveled stairs and common pathway that led to defendant's front door, into deep
snow and up a hill to the rear of the defendant's condominium unit, which sat on a bluff
above common pathway.

(RT:48:10-13; RT:49:3-5).

After climbing uphill through

unshovelled snow, the officer arrived at the rear patio and sliding glass door of the
defendant's condo. The curtain to the door was open, but the officer could not see the
defendant until he had completed his uphill slog and was standing on the patio.
(RT:50:12-15).
When Lealaitafea approached the window, he looked inside and saw a man dressed
only in boxer shorts and his socks. (RT:51:20-21). The officer began rapping on the
window and made eye contact with the man inside the condominium. (RT:37). Initially,
the man did not come to the door but instead tried to hide by crouching down behind his
bed. Id.

The officer did not leave, however, nor did he call out that he just wanted to

ask a few questions. Instead, he gestured to the man and ordered him to "Come and talk to
me." (RT:39:4-12).

Only after the officer issued this command did defendant stand up

from his hiding place and open the door. (RT:39:13-16). It was not until after the
defendant opened the sliding glass door that Lealaitafea was able to note the "odor of
alcohol" on which the officer based his further decision to ask the defendant to get
dressed, step outside and submit to a field sobriety test. (RT:40:8-16; RT:41:9-15; RT:43).
When the defendant failed the test, he was arrested and charged with the third degree
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felony of driving under the influence. (RT:43).
Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress "any and all evidence acquired by the
State" on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to detain the defendant without the
evidence obtained by Officer Lealaitafea after through the defendant's sliding glass door,
after ordering him to "come and talk." The motion was denied.

Based upon the

evidence obtained through the illegal search and seizure, the defendant was convicted of
the third degree felony of driving under the influence. This appeal followed.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
When the police officer left the common pathway to wade through unplowed snow,
up a hill to the private patio of defendant's condominium, he did so without a warrant.
Defendant's private patio constituted the "curtilage" of defendant's home and under the
United States Supreme Court case of United States v. Dunn, is entitled to the same Fourth
Amendment protection as the defendant's home itself.
From his position on the patio, the police officer was able for the first time to view
the defendant through the sliding glass door. The defendant attempted to avoid talking to
the officer by crouching down behind his bed, but when the officer rapped on the window
again and commanded the defendant to "come and talk to me," the defendant answered the
door. By demanding that the defendant open the door, the officer escalated what might
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have otherwise been a voluntary encounter to a "level two" detention, likewise without a
warrant and without a reasonable suspicion to detain defendant.
Under applicable state and federal law, either of these two unauthorized acts
constituted an impermissible violation of defendant's Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable search and seizure. Taken together, they compel the conclusion that the
evidence of defendant's intoxication was illegally obtained and must be suppressed.

ARGUMENT

The trial court's denial of the motion to suppress was based on an improper
interpretation of the law that applies to the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy
in his own home and the immediately surrounding area of the home, or the "curtilage."
The correct application of the law establishes that the officer's unwarranted incursion
upon the curtilage was an unauthorized invasion of defendant's right to privacy and his
subsequent detention was a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be safe from
unauthorized searches and seizures. The court also incorrectly applied the law with
respect to the determination of whether the defendant's opening of the sliding glass door
was "voluntary."
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Because the trial court's analysis of defendant's privacy rights was based on an
incorrect interpretation of the law, the decision to deny the motion to suppress should be
review de novo. Such a review compels the conclusion that the trial court's refusal to
suppress the evidence was wrong, and should be reversed. Without the illegally obtained
evidence, there was no basis for either the charge, or the conviction on the charge, of
driving under the influence. Accordingly, the verdict should be set aside.

ARGUMENT

The Trial Court Erred When It Denied Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence
Obtained By Invading Defendant's Private Space and Compelling Him Open a
Locked Door to Answer Questions

A.

The Arresting Officer's Warrantless Incursion Onto
Defendant's Back Patio Was A Violation of Defendant's Fourth
Amendment Right Against Unreasonable Search and Seizure

It is beyond dispute that a person has a constitutionally protected right to privacy
and is accorded the full range of Fourth Amendment protections in his own home. Lewis
v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211, 87 S.Ct. 424, 427 (1966); State v. Atwood, 831 P.2d
1056, 1058 (Ut.App. 1992). This protection also extends to the "curtilage55 of the house -
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namely the areas surrounding the house that are sufficiently attached or connected to the
home as to entitle them to the same protections.
Whether an area that is not within the house itself falls within the constitutionally
protected curtilage was addressed by the United States Supreme Court in the seminal
decision of United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987). It is this case that set forth
the standards which must be used to determine whether a particular area falls within the
constitutionally protection afforded to the home itself.

The trial court failed to apply

these factors to its decision that the back patio was a "public" area; proper application of
the factors compels the conclusion that the patio (which was the only vantage point from
which the officer could see into defendant's home) does, in fact, fall within a
constitutionally protected area.
The four factors that Dunn requires a court to analyze in determining this issue are:
1) the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home; 2) whether the area is
included within an enclosure surrounding the home; 3) the nature of the uses to which the
area is put; and 4) the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by
people passing by. Dunn, at 300.
The trial court in this case considered none of these factors. In this case, the trial
court found that the patio was public because there were "no visible paths, markings, signs
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or anything else that forbade Lealaitafea from approaching the sliding glass door."2

In

reaching this decision the Court misconstrued what is required under Dunn for an area to
be considered private, and therefore part of the home's protected curtilage.
The question under Dunn is not whether the police officer was physically barred
from entering a given space, but rather whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation
of privacy with respect to the given location.

A person is not required, as a condition of

maintaining his privacy, to construct barriers around his house to keep people out if
application of the Dunn factors supports the conclusion that the area in question was one
that the defendant reasonably expected would be considered private.
An analysis of the four Dunn factors to the facts of this case shows that the patio
area from which Lealaitafea was first able to see the defendant does, in fact, fall within the
constitutionally protected "curtilage" of defendant's home.
1.

The Area Is Immediately Adjacent to the Home

The first Dunn factor requires the court to consider "the proximity of the area
claimed to be curtilage to the house." In this case, the area in question is immediately
adjacent to the defendant's home/condo. The only thing separating the patio area from
the house is a sliding glass window.

The close proximity of the patio area to the home

2

Part of this finding - that there were no visible paths to the door - actually
supports the conclusion that the door, and the area adjacent to the door, were intended
to be private.
10

satisfies the first of the Dunn factors to support a finding that the area is within the home's
curtilage.

2.

The Area Is Included Within An "Enclosure" Defined
by the Natural Terrain Surrounding the Condo Unit

The second Dunn factor is whether the area is included within an "enclosure"
surrounding the home. The trial court concluded that because there was no fence
enclosing the area and no markings or signs forbidding access to the area, that it was
therefore open and public. This is not, however, the appropriate legal standard for
analyzing whether the area in question is "enclosed" within the meaning of Dunn.
As one court has observed:
[Rjeading the word 'enclosure' in Dunn to require an artificial
barrier seems unduly narrow. The boxwood hedge and heavy
woods created a natural enclosure around the home and yard;
requiring a person to expend resources and sacrifice aesthetics
by building a fence in order to obtain protection from
unreasonable searches is not required by the constitution.

Williams v. Garrett, 722 F. Supp. 254, 260-1 (W.D. Va. 1989).

See also, United States v.

Reilly, 76 F.3d. 1271, 1277-8 (finding that an area that was bordered in part by
"hedgerows along the east and west sides, and by thick woods on the north side" satisfied
the requirements of an enclosure.").
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In this case, an application of this legal test to the facts of this case shows that, like
the areas in question in Williams and Reilly, the defendant's patio was "enclosed" by the
natural terrain surrounding the condo complex. The condo complex itself is located on a
bluff above the parking garage and common stairs and pathway.

The sliding glass door

was not the main access to the defendant's condo; the front door can be reached by a
public pathway, but there was no path to the patio. The officer admitted that the patio
door was not visible from the public pathway and that it was only after leaving the public
pathway and slogging up a hill through unplowed snow that he was able to access the patio
and peer through sliding glass door.
As in Williams, defendant here is not required to block his view and incur the
expense of erecting a fence in order to protect his privacy, when the uncontroverted
evidence is that no one can see in through the window - and his privacy remains
sacrosanct - unless they first take a non-public, unmarked, unplowed uphill hike to the
patio.

The trial court's conclusion that the area must be public because there were no

visible "keep out" signs fails to properly apply the Dunn factor of to determine whether the
area in question is de facto, enclosed by virtue of the surrounding terrain and whether the
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the area entered by the
police.
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3.

Use

The third factor in the Dunn analysis is the use to which the area is put by the
resident. There was little evidence of use of this space, other than its general
inaccessibility and the fact that, unlike the front door which is accessed via a public path,
the rear patio can be accessed only through the condo or by taking a non-public route up a
hill.

There was no evidence that the area behind and immediately adjacent to the

defendant's condo was part of the condo public area, or that the space was generally used
by, or even accessible to, the public. Accordingly, the application of this third Dunn
factor also supports the conclusion that the patio and sliding glass door were within the
protected curtilage of the defendant's residence.
4.

Steps Taken By the Defendant to Protect His Privacy

The fourth Dunn factor that must be considered is the "steps taken by the resident to
protect his privacy." The analysis of this factor again supports the conclusion that the
patio and window should be considered "private."
The uncontroverted evidence is that the terrain surrounding the condo makes it
impossible to even see the patio or the window, much less look through the window to see
the interior of the condo, from any public walkway or path.

Again, as the court held in

Williams, a resident does not need to erect a fence, or even pull curtains, to protect his
privacy when in fact it is impossible to see into the space in question without
bushwhacking uphill through non-public condo areas.
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Taken collectively, the Dunn factors compel the conclusion that the defendant's
patio and sliding glass door are part of the protected curtilage of his home. He had no
reason to believe that an invited visitor would ever approach his condominium in that
fashion, or that anyone other than he would use, occupy or transition that space without his
consent.

The trial court failed to properly apply the Dunn factors to the facts and reached

the wrong result.
The unwarranted incursion into the private area of defendant's property renders
inadmissible everything discovered as a result of the incursion. Sun Wong, Rieck. The
trial court's misapplication of the law on this point compels the reversal of the trial court's
denial of the motion to suppress.
B.

The Arresting Officer's Detention of Defendant After The Illegal
Incursion Was A Violation of Defendant's Fourth Amendment
Right Against Unreasonable Search and Seizure

After slogging through knee-deep snow and up a steep hill to peer into defendant's
sliding glass patio door, the police officer was first able to see into the defendant's home.
The officer made eye contact with the defendant, who then attempted to hide behind a bed.
The officer commanded the defendant to come to the door to answer questions, a
command that the defendant was not, under the circumstances, free to ignore. As set forth
above, the incursion of the police into this protected area was already a violation of the
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, even before anything else happened. Even if the
patio was a place where the officer was entitled to be, however, what happened after he
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got there compels the conclusion that his questioning of the defendant was an unwarranted
"level two" detention as defined by Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, Ijl 1.
A level two stop, which involves an investigative detention (however brief) is a
Fourth Amendment seizure and requires that police have a reasonable suspicion to make
that detention. A level two search occurs when "a reasonable person, in view of all the
circumstances, would believe he or she is not free to leave. This is true even if the
purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention brief." Salt Lake City v. Ray,
2000 UT App 55,1J11.
The trial court found that, prior to arriving at the patio sliding glass door, Officer
Lealaitafea was not possessed of sufficient information to support a "reasonable suspicion
to detain defendant." (CT:85; Opinion, ^f 3, p. 5). Accordingly, the officer was only
entitled to conduct a "level one" questioning of the defendant and was precluded from
escalating the encounter to a "level two" detention.

An investigating officer is entitled

obtain evidence through a "level one" acceptance of a "knock and talk" invitation by a
cooperating witness, but that acceptance must be voluntary and not coerced.

If, taking

the totality of the circumstances into account, the defendant was not reasonably free to
decline to speak with the officer, then the detention escalated to an impermissible "level
two" detention and all evidence derived from that unwarranted detention should be
suppressed. See, State v. Alvey, 2007 UT App 161, ^f 4 and 5.
In Alvey, the Court of Appeals concluded that, based on the totality of the
circumstances, an encounter between the police and Alvey escalated to a level two seizure

when, following a traffic stop, the sheriff instructed Alvey to stand in front of the police
cruiser and remove his hands from his pockets. Under these circumstances, the Court
concluded "we simply do not believe a reasonable person would feel free to leave once a
police officer ordered him to move to a different location from where he was standing"
and that based on the totality of the circumstances, "including the sheriffs use of
authoritative language to instruct Alvey to move" the detention was escalated to a "level
two" detention. Alvey, \ 5 (emphasis supplied).
The facts in this case are virtually identical to the facts that led the court in Alvey to
conclude that the encounter between the police and the defendant was an unwarranted
"level two" detention.

At the time of the encounter at issue in this case, the police

officer was standing on a patio that could only be reached by leaving the public walkway
and climbing up a hill. It was after 4 a.m. in the morning and defendant was wearing only
his boxers and a shirt. The defendant, by attempting to hide behind a piece of furniture,
clearly indicated that he that he did not wish to come to the door and speak with the
officer.

The uniformed officer, with holstered weapon clearly visible, did not ask the

defendant if he was willing to answer some questions; rather, he used "authoritative
language" and ordered the defendant to leave his position crouched behind the bed to
"come and talk." Only after being ordered to do so by the officer did the defendant move
from behind the bed where he was attempting to hide and came to the door.
In reaching the conclusion that the interaction between the defendant and the
officer was voluntary, the trial court did not apply the factors set forth in Ray and Alvey.

A correct analysis of all the facts and circumstances in light of these controlling cases
compels the conclusion that the interaction between the defendant and the officer was not
voluntary.

Under the totality of the circumstances - the hour, the location, the

defendant's state of undress, his initial refusal to answer the door and the officer's
authoritative language in ordering the defendant to come to the door and talk - a
reasonable person would not believe that he had the option of refusing the order. The trial
court conclusion that the evidence obtained by virtue of this illegal detention was,
nonetheless, admissible was erroneous, and should be reversed.

CONCLUSION
The Fourth Amendment protects a semi-clad person, enjoying the sanctity of his
own home, from being detained and questioned at four in the morning by a police officer
who has suddenly appeared at a back door that cannot be accessed only by climbing up a
bluff through deep snow. The Fourth Amendment also prevents the questioning of a
person who has initially refused to speak with the police without a basis for a "level two"
detention; that evidence did not exist in this case until after the defendant came to the door
in response to the officer's command.
The trial court erred in determining that the encounter was voluntary and the
evidence obtained through the encounter, admissible. This error compels an reversal of
the denial of the motion to suppress.

Without the illegally obtained evidence, the state

had no basis to charge the defendant with driving under the influence and the jury had no

basis to convict, so reversal of the denial of the suppression motion should also result in
vacating jury verdict and conviction.

Dated: January 22, 2009

Respectfully submitted:

By:

01K-&—SARA PFROMMER
Attorney for Appellant Travis Perkins

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY U.S. MAIL
I hereby certify that on this 23rd day of January, 2009, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT TRAVIS PERKINS was placed in the United States
Mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Joy Natale
Summit County Attorney
6300 North Silver Creek Drive
Park City, UT 84098

DATED this 22rd day of January, 2009.
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RECEIVED
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DAVID R. BRICKEY, #6188
Summit County Attorney
Summit County Justice Center
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Park City, Utah 84098
Telephone (435) 615-3828
Facsimile (435) 615-3833
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
in and for SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT
PLAINTIFF
VS.

:
:

TRAVIS JAMES PERKINS,
D.O.B. 02-04-85

CRIMINAL NO. 071500347

:
Judge Bruce C. Lubeck

DEFENDANT.
On the 20th day of October, 2008, appeared Joy Natale, Prosecuting Attorney, attorney for
the State of Utah, and the defendant appeared in person with counsel, Blake Nakamura.
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant has been convicted upon a plea of guilty of the
offense of DUI, a Third Degree Felony. The court having asked if the defendant had anything
to say why judgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being
shown or appearing to the court,
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant is guilty as charged and convicted.
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant be confined at the Utah State Prison for a period of
zero to five years and is fined $3,000.00 plus an 85 % surcharge, as provided by law for the crime

of DUI, a Third Degree Felony.
IT IS ORDERED that the defendant is granted a stay of execution of the above sentence
and the defendant is placed on probation with Adult Probation and Parole for a period of thirty-six
(36) months under the following conditions:
1.

That defendant maintain good behavior and have no violations of any laws;

2.

That the defendant serve sixty-two and one-half (62 V2) days in the Summit County
Jail forthwith;

3.

That the defendant report to Adult Probation and Parole within twenty-four (24)
hours of his release from jail;

4.

That the defendant not use or possess alcohol or frequent places where alcohol is
the chief item of order;

5.

That the defendant not work at Harry O's unless approval is obtained from Adult
Probation and Parole;

6.

That the defendant enter into a substance abuse evaluation and complete any
treatment deemed necessary;

7.

That the defendant enter into and successfully complete medical and mental health
evaluation and follow through with any recommended treatment deemed necessary
by Adult Probation and Parole;

8.

That the defendant pay a fine in the amount of $ 1,500.00 at a rate to be determined
by Adult Probation and Parole;

9.

That the defendant install an ignition interlock device on any vehicle owned or
operated by the defendant;

10.

That the defendant submit to alcohol testing at the request of Adult Probation and
Parole;

11.

That the defendant submit to random searches at the request of Adult Probation and
Parole;

12.

That the defendant maintain full-time employment or vocational training;

13.

That the defendant not drive a motor vehicle without a valid license or insurance
or with any alcohol in his system.

DATED this

day of October, 2008.
BY THE COURT:

Bruce C. Lubeck
Third District Court Judge
MAILING CERTIFICATE
o$y I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, this
£A0 day of October, 2008, to the following:
Blake Nakamura
142 East 200 South, Suite 312
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,

Case No. 071500347
vs.

Honorable BRUCE C.
TRAVIS JAMES PERKINS,

MAY 05 2008

Defendant,
DATE: May 1, 2008

The above matter came before the court for decision an
Defendant's Motion to Suppress.

BACKGROUND
An information was filed on December 13, 2007, charging
defendant with felony driving under the influence of alcohol, and
misdemeanor offenses of driving in violation of an alcohol
restricted license and without an interlock device. After being
bound over after a preliminary hearing held February 12, 2008,
defendant filed a motion to suppress on March 10, 2008.

An

evidentiary hearing was held March 31, 2008.
The court heard evidence and took the matter under
advisement, and allowed the parties to file further memoranda.
The State filed its response April 16, 2008. Defendant filed a
reply April 28, 2008. Oral argument was held April 28, 2008
before receipt of the reply of defendant.

The court heard oral

argument and took the issues under advisement to further consider
the memoranda and the arguments.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. In the early hours, about 3:50 a.m., of December 12,
2007, a Deer Valley Ski Resort Security Officer Muller (Muller)
came across a vehicle evidently stuck in the snow on the side of
a road in the Deer Valley area.

Muller attempted to get the

attention of the driver, identified as defendant, but had a
difficult time doing so.

After pulling up next to defendant who

finally responded, Muller saw defendant attempt to drive out of
the snow but he was unable to do so.

Muller spoke with defendant

and detected defendant was intoxicated in Muller's opinion, as
his speech was slurred and "muddled."
2. Muller called the police and told them there was an
intoxicated driver stuck and gave the location.

As Muller was on

the phone with the police defendant walked away from his vehicle
and toward a parking structure nearby.

Muller observed that and

told dispatch the driver was intoxicated and was leaving the area
on foot.
3.

Officers responded and Park City Police Department

Officer Lealaitafea (Lealaitafea) arrived within 8 minutes of the
dispatch.

He found Muller and Muller described defendant as to

clothing and size and such, and Muller told Lealaitafea where
Muller had seen defendant go in the nearby parking structure.
Muller explained to Lealaitafea what he, Muller, had seen
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defendant do in the vehicle and how defendant appeared.
4. Lealaitafea went into the parking structure and saw
footprints leading through the snow from that parking structure.
Lealaitafea followed those foot prints across the snow, the only
set of prints leading from the area, to a condominium in the
area.

From the patio area Lealaitafea could see into the condo

unit through a sliding glass door as the curtains were open. As
Lealaitafea approached the sliding glass door he could see
defendant inside the condo.

Defendant matched the description

Muller had given, and defendant as he saw Lealaitafea was
attempting to hide behind a bed.
5. Lealaitafea knocked on the glass door and motioned for
defendant to come to the door and defendant did so, wearing boxer
shorts and a shirt.

No one else was visible in the room.

Defendant opened the door and Lealaitafea could smell a strong
odor of alcohol from defendant, saw defendant's eyes were red and
glassy, and heard defendant's speech which was slurred.
6. Lealaitafea asked, while he was still outside and
defendant inside, what kind of car defendant had and where
defendant's car was and defendant said it was stuck in the snow
and he had driven it there. Defendant said he had a Subaru, which
was consistent with the vehicle Lealaitafea had seen stuck in the
snow. The ground was covered in snow and Lealaitafea was in an
area that was not enclosed by any fences or structures, evidently

-3-

the back sliding glass door of a condo unit.

Lealaitafea then

asked defendant if he could come in and defendant said yes.
Lealaitafea saw a pair of pants and shoes covered in snow on the
floor.

Lealaitafea asked defendant to get dressed and defendant

put on the snow covered shoes and pants and went outside with
Lealaitafea.
outside.

Lealaitafea asked defendant if he could come

While it was not expressed, the purpose of that request

was to see if Muller could identify defendant. The officer and
defendant walked outside to the parking structure and there
Muller identified defendant as the person he had seen in the car
trying to remove it from being stuck in the snow.

Lealaitafea

then had defendant perform field sobriety tests and defendant was
arrested based on the result of those tests. This was at 4:22 am
and Lealaitafea had been called at 3:51 a.m. and arrived at the
scene at 3:59 a.m.

Defendant moves to suppress "any and all evidence acquired
by the State."

There was allegedly insufficient evidence to

detain defendant and the plain view observations of defendant
were from a place he was not permitted to lawfully be.
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DISCUSSION and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Muller was a reliable source of information.

He gave his

name, he was not otherwise interested, and he remained to meet
with the officers and gave sufficient detail which was in fact
corroborated. The officer saw the vehicle stuck in the snow and
that corroborated what Muller had told dispatch then the officer
when he arrived.
2. Lealaitafea, when he approached the sliding glass door,
was not in a private, enclosed area.

It was snow covered ground

in December, alleged to be a patio, but there was no evidence
that it was in any way private.
building.

It was the back of a condo

There were no visible paths, markings, signs, or

anything else that forbade Lealaitafea from approaching the
sliding glass door.
3. At that point Lealaitafea had information a person had
been driving while intoxicated.

That information was from a

reliable citizen-informant, who had given information
corroborated by Lealaitafea when he saw the vehicle stuck in the
snow.

The informant, Muller, remained and talked with

Lealaitafea and told Lealaitafea what he had seen.

Muller gave

detail as to physical description and where Muller had seen
defendant go.

That information did not amount to reasonable

suspicion to detain defendant, however.
4. When Lealaitafea approached the sliding glass door he saw
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through the sliding glass door and open curtains a person
matching the description given by Muller.

He motioned for the

person to come to the door and the person, defendant, tried to
crouch down and hide behind a bed.

When defendant did approach

and open the sliding glass door, Lealaitafea remained outside.
Lealaitafea saw defendant and formed the opinion he was in fact
intoxicated, based on the slurred speech, glassy eyes, and strong
odor of alcohol coming from defendant.
and in fact a consensual encounter.

The encounter was indeed

Objectively defendant was

free to tell the officer to go away, defendant could have refused
to speak with the officer.

While it does not matter, Lealaitafea

testified if defendant would not have talked to him, Lealaitafea
would have had to walk away.

That is correct and while the

officer's subjective belief does not enter into the equation, the
officer was correct.

Lealaitafea had some information before

speaking with defendant, but not enough to amount to reasonable
suspicion to justify a detention of defendant.

However, once

defendant spoke with Lealaitafea, the officer had then gained
sufficient reasonable suspicion to detain defendant when combined
with the previous information and all Lealaitafea had observed.
After observing that in fact defendant, who matched the
description and was hiding, was intoxicated and admitted he had
driven his car (again matching what Lealaitafea had been told and
had seen), Lealaitafea had sufficient reasonable suspicion to
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detain defendant temporarily. Defendant argues he has a
heightened expectation of privacy and that consensual encounters
must occur in public.

The court disagrees.

Defendant indeed

could have told the officer to leave, that defendant did not want
to talk to Lealaitafea.

A reasonable person would not feel they

must answer the door or that they must talk to an officer in
their own home. No level of suspicion is needed for an officer to
approach a home and ask to talk to the resident.

Lealaitafea

needed no level of suspicion to ask defendant to speak with him.
The resident is free to decline or accept, that is, consent to
talk.

There is no indication here that the officer used any

coercion or force to get defendant to speak with him.

Defendant

later invited Lealaitafea in when the officer asked if he could
come in.

Defendant was not wearing pants and it was a reasonable

request to have defendant put pants on.
5. Asking defendant to come outside was clearly a detention
requiring reasonable suspicion.

Lealaitafea had such at that

point based on what he had been told by a reliable citizeninformant Muller, what had been corroborated by Lealaitafea's own
observations and what defendant himself had stated to
Lealaitafea.
6. In combination and totality, those facts Lealaitafea was
aware of amounted to reasonable suspicion to further detain
defendant; that is, ask defendant to come outside for a quick
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investigative routine to see if defendant was in fact the person
seen operating a vehicle. If the officer has reasonable suspicion
based on the totality of the circumstances to temporarily detain
a person, he must diligently pursue an investigation that is
likely to confirm or dispel his suspicions while the defendant is
detained. Here, the officer pursued the least intrusive
investigation possible at that point and requested defendant to
merely step outside to the parking structure where Muller was to
see if Muller could identify him. That investigative technique
was designed to either confirm or dispel the suspicion
Laelaitafea had and it was accomplished quickly.

After Muller

identified defendant Lealaitafea administered field sobriety
tests and arrested defendant based on probable cause arising from
the results of those tests.

The court DENIES the motion to suppress.
As noted in court, the matter is set for a status conference
May 19, 2008, at 8:30 a.m.

This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other
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order is required.

DATED this

day of

* /\ AL(^£_,

/

2008.
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